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Abstract—We present a signaling architecture for network
traffic authorization, Permission-Based Sending (PBS). This ar-
chitecture aims to prevent Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks and
other forms of unauthorized traffic. Towards this goal, PBS takes
a hybrid approach: a proactive approach of explicit permissions
and a reactive approach of monitoring and countering attacks.
On-path signaling is used to configure the permission state stored
in routers for a data flow. The signaling approach enables easy
installation and management of the permission state, and its use of
soft-state improves robustness of the system. For secure permission
state setup, PBS provides security for signaling in two ways:
signaling messages are encrypted end-to-end using public key
encryption and TLS provides hop-by-hop encryption of signaling
paths. In addition, PBS uses IPsec for data packet authentication.
Our analysis and performance evaluation show that PBS is an
effective and scalable solution for preventing various kinds of
attack scenarios, including Byzantine attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Currently, the Internet architecture allows any node to in-
ject IP packets into the network without requiring explicit
permission from the intended receiver. As Internet usage and
applications have exploded over the past decade, this simple
architecture has enabled misuse of the network itself. Indeed,
it has made Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks possible and often
lead to degraded quality of service. DoS attacks have become a
particular problem since so-called botnets have made it possible
for remote attackers to commandeer end systems and use them
to disrupt communication.
A report on network security threats published by Syman-
tec [1] estimates an average of 6,110 DoS attacks per day
during the first six months of 2006. The report also observed
an increase of the number of active botnet computers per day
from 10,352 in 2005 to 52,771 in 2007. Arbor networks [2]
provided a bandwidth measurement of DoS attacks indicating
a steady growth. The largest attack size in 2007 exceeded 40
gigabits per second.
Existing proposals on how to prevent DoS attacks can be
classified in two ways. A reactive approach monitors network
traffic. If an attack is detected, an action is taken against it.
Filtering-based approaches [3][4][5] fall into this category. A
proactive approach sets up a rule that all data flows between a
sender and a receiver have to follow. Data flows that violate
the rule are simply dropped. SOS [6] and capability-based
approaches [7][8][9][10] are examples of proactive approaches.
Each approach has advantages and disadvantages. An advan-
tage of a reactive approach is its ability to adapt its counter-
attack strategy dynamically as it monitors on-going attacks.
However, there are two disadvantages in a reactive approach. It
is not always possible to differentiate legitimate packets from
malicious packets [6], and by the time a reactive algorithm
detected and acted against an attack, the attacker might have
already accomplished his objective. In contrast, a proactive
approach can prevent such an attack from taking place preemp-
tively by setting up appropriate system rules. However, such an
approach bears a risk of letting an attacker into the system if
the attacker is able to circumvent the rules. Neither reactive nor
proactive approach is effective against a compromised router.
We developed a new approach to prevent unauthorized traffic.
Our approach, called Permission-Based Sending (PBS), is a
hybrid of the proactive and reactive approaches, combining the
benefits of two approaches and mitigating their disadvantages
at the same time. We use an explicit permission to give
legitimate packets the authority to send (proactive approach),
and use a monitoring mechanism to detect and react against
attacks (reactive approach). The explicit permission allows
differentiation of benign traffic from malicious one, and can
limit the severity of attacks. The monitoring mechanism can
provide a second line of defense against malicious traffic, which
may have circumvented the permission-based mechanism.
To implement our hybrid approach, we developed a secure
and robust signaling architecture. In this architecture, the end
hosts send signaling messages along the path of data flow in
order to install permission states into the routers in the path.
This is called on-path signaling. The signaling messages also
contain information about traffic volume that can be used for
network monitoring. To securely set up the permission state,
signaling messages are protected end-to-end against alternation
using digital signature. The channel security (TLS and DTLS)
is used hop-by-hop for integrity and confidentiality of signal-
ing messages. The soft-state mechanism of PBS supports the
robustness against the state changes. Data packets use IPsec to
authenticate the origin.
We analyze various attack models and show how PBS
can be used to counter those attacks. In particular, our PBS
can effectively prevent Byzantine attacks, which have been
considered difficult to counteract. Furthermore, our evaluation
shows that the signaling overhead is small enough to make PBS
a practical solution in large scale networks.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In
Section II, we give an overview of PBS. We present security
2analysis in Section III. In Section IV, we provide the archi-
tecture and implementation details. We present performance
evaluation in Section V. In Section VI, we discuss deployment
issues of PBS. Finally, we discuss related work in Section VII.
II. PBS OVERVIEW
The goal of permission-based PBS is to allow the legitimate
senders to send data by granting permission and drop the
unauthorized packets by default.
A. Design goal
There are five design requirements for PBS: it must be
deployable, distributed, robust, secure, and scalable.
PBS should work in the current Internet infrastructure. For
example, it should not modify IP packet headers or TCP/UDP
packet headers. Thus, PBS uses signaling messages to set
up and manage permission state, instead of piggybacking the
permission information in the IP packet header or TCP/UDP
packet header. PBS uses existing security protocols, such as
IPsec, TLS and digital signatures.
PBS should be a distributed system to eliminate the necessity
of managing a central server. Thus, the permission state is
managed between the receiver and the sender along the data
path by signaling. A subset of routers keeps state for a data
flow, and monitors whether the flow is authorized.
PBS should be robust in the face of changes, such as routing
and permission. Soft-state of PBS supports the robustness of
the system. Thus, the permission state is periodically refreshed
by signaling messages. At the absence of the refresh of a state,
the permission state is eliminated.
The permission setup and management should be secure.
Therefore, the signaling messages that install and modify the
permission state and distribute cryptography keys are protected
by cryptography algorithms. Data packet is also protected by
against alternation.
PBS should be scalable to be applicable in large scale
networks. In PBS, PBS functionality does not need to be
implemented in all routers. Thus, some of the routers that have
PBS functionality properly handle the authorization of data
flows. In addition, the computational and signaling overhead
is small for scalability as we show in Section V.
B. Explicit permission using signaling
For permission state setup and management, PBS uses a
suite of IP signaling protocols that have been developed by
the IETF Next Steps in Signaling (NSIS) working group [11].
The NSIS protocol suite consists of two protocol layers: the
NSIS Transport Layer Protocol (NTLP) and NSIS Signaling
Layer Protocols (NSLPs) [12].
The General Internet Signaling Transport (GIST) [13] im-
plements NTLP. The main purposes of GIST are to determine
how to reach the next node along the data path (routing) and
deliver signaling messages to the peer (transport). GIST sup-
ports some design requires of PBS, such as on-path signaling,
robustness against route changes, ability to work on the current
networking architectures, and scalability. GIST provides on-
path signaling by using underlying routing state information to
deliver signaling messages along the data path. GIST is robust
to route changes because it detects the route change and informs
the NSLP layer about the changes (see [13] for more details).
GIST reuses the existing transport layer protocols and security
protocols, so that it does not require modification of current
network protocols. As Fu et al. [14] evaluated the performance
of the GIST protocol, GIST supports scalability. The authors
observed that “A GIST node serving 45,000 signaling sessions
is found to consume small amount of CPU and memory”
[14]. Not all routers need to have NSIS functionality. The
signaling messages bypass the router, which does not have the
functionality.
On top of GIST, PBS needs a way to authorize network
traffic, so we developed a new NSLP, the PBS NSLP [15].
The NTLP (GIST) handles all incoming signaling messages
and it passes the PBS-related signaling messages to the PBS
NSLP layer. There are two message types in the PBS NSLP;
namely Query (Q) and Permission (P ) messages. The Query
message is sent by a sender to request permission to send data.
It contains the flow identification object, whose information is
5-tuple (source IP address, destination IP address, source port,
destination port, and protocol identifier), describing data flow.
It also contains a requested volume of data in bytes for a flow.
The Permission message is sent by the receiver who grants the
permission to the sender along the reverse path of the Query
message. The reverse path is set up by the GIST reverse routing
state. The Permission message is used to set up (grant), remove
(revoke) and modify permission state for a flow. The Permission
message contains the flow identification, the allowed volume in
bytes, time limit for the permission, and the refresh time for
soft-state. The PBS nodes, which are routers and end hosts
that have PBS functionality, store these information to keep
track of permission states. The delivery of signaling messages
is performed hop-by-hop approach between the adjacent PBS
nodes. In other words, each PBS node forwards the signaling
message to the next PBS node. The Query and Permission
messages are periodically transmitted to establish soft-state that
enables the detection of permission state and security algorithm
changes.
PBS supports the asymmetric transmission of Query and
Permission messages. After the permission state is set up, the
Permission message can be sent when a receiver wants to
change (revoke and modify) the permission state and security
mechanism without receiving a Query message.
C. Security of messages
Many forms of DDoS attacks employed today do not need
to spoof source addresses. However, IP address spoofing is
still prevalent [16] [17]. “Approximately 25% of netblock and
ASes allow some form of spoofing,” according to Beverly and
Bauer [16]. Therefore, authentication and integrity of signaling
messages are required for secure permission state setup and
management.
3PBS uses a public key cryptography mechanism for the
authentication and integrity of signaling messages. Each sender
and receiver generates a public/private key pair, and generates
a digital signature by encrypting the objects of signaling
messages using its own private key (i.e., the sender encrypts
the objects of the Query message with its private key and the
receiver encrypts the objects of the Permission message with
its private key). Each public key in the form of the X.509
certificate, which is certified by a trusted third party (certificate
authority), is distributed by a signaling message to the PBS
nodes. The Query message carries the sender’s public key
and the Permission message carries the receiver’s public key.
To validate the authentication and integrity of the signaling
messages, each PBS node decrypts the digital signature using
the distributed public key.
For the authentication and integrity of data packets, IPsec
Authentication Header (AH) is used. The Permission message
carries the shared key and security parameter index (SPI),
which are generated by the receiver and will be used for IPsec.
When each PBS node receives the Permission message, it stores
the shared key and installs the security association (SA). For
each flow, the SA has field values for destination IP address,
IPsec protocol (AH or ESP) and SPI. To securely deliver the key
and SPI value, channel security protocol (TLS or DTLS) is used
between adjacent PBS nodes. PBS functionality allows PBS
routers to validate the IPsec that uses transport mode between
the two end hosts (sender and receiver).
For the authentication data field in IPsec AH, the sender
uses symmetric key cryptography or public key cryptography.
In symmetric key cryptography, the shared symmetric key
that is delivered in the Permission message is used for the
encryption. The public key cryptography method entails using
the sender’s private key for encryption. The receiver has the
right to choose a cryptography algorithm for IPsec based on
the policy, network and applications, and this notification is
carried in the Permission message.
Fig. 1 shows the secure two-way handshakes for permission
state setup and how PBS can prevent attack flows. Since the
attacker does not have the shared key, the attack flow failed
during IPsec verification. Thus, it is dropped at the first router
(R1).
D. Monitoring and reaction against DoS attacks
Other routers that do not have PBS functionality cannot
generate bogus data packets because they do not have the
shared key. A compromised PBS router that knows the shared
key, however, can generate and insert attack packets when
symmetric key cryptography is used in IPsec AH. Furthermore,
an off-path attacker (i.e., external attacker) might obtain the
shared key by controlling compromised PBS routers. Com-
promised routers, which may or may not be PBS routers,
can drop legitimate packets. To prevent the attacks in this
Byzantine network, PBS requires monitoring of network traffic
and detecting attacks. The detection algorithm is called PBS
Detection Algorithm (PDA). PDA uses existing signaling mes-
sages (Query and Permission messages) and soft-state of the
Basic operation of prevention
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Fig. 1. PBS basic operation —— FID: Flow identification; RV: The volume of
data that the sender requests; AV: The volume of data that the receiver grants;
TTL: Time limit for the permission; RT: refresh time for soft-state; PK: The
certificate of a public key; Auth: The authentication field (digital signature) that
is encrypted by one’s private key; DF: Defense object. It has solution field (the
indicated solution against the attack), IPsec AuthAlgo field (the cryptography
algorithm for the IPsec authentication field), a shared key, and SPI value.
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1Mar'/!2EEL HMTN!O4!" QSHSFig. 2. Basic operation of the PBS Detection Algorithm (SV: The volume of
data that the sender has sent; Recv: The volume of data that the receiver has
received; size: data size)
system. A sender periodically sends the Query message that
contains a volume of data that it has sent after the permission
is granted. The attacker cannot modify the volume information
in the Query message since the Query message is protected
by public key cryptography. The receiver compares the volume
of data in the signaling message with the volume of data that
has been received. If both of the volumes are the same, there
is no attack, but if both of them are different, the receiver
suspects that there is an attack. Based on the detection, a
receiver requests the senders to react against the attack.
Fig. 2 shows the basic operation of PDA. We assume that the
receiver grants permission to the sender to send a flow of size
10 MB. After setting up the permission state, the sender sends
data packets whose total volume is 1 MB. Since a compromised
router has the shared key, it can generate attack packets with
the correct IPsec header. It sends attack packets whose total
volume is 2 MB. After period T , the sender sends a Query
message that contains a volume (1 MB) of data that it has sent.
The receiver can detect the attack by comparing the volume
(1 MB) in the Query message and total volume of data (3 MB)
4that it has received. After the receiver detects the attack, it sends
the Permission messages with an indication to use public key
cryptography to generate authentication field of IPsec header.
Therefore, after the sender uses public key cryptography for
the IPsec, the attack packets are dropped at a router because of
the IPsec verification process.
PDA can detect the packet dropping attacks by a compro-
mised router. A compromised router drops all packets (in-
cluding signaling messages) or selected packets (e.g., every n
packets). When a compromised router drops all packets, since
the sender does not receive a Permission message, the sender
suspects that the packets have been dropped. Therefore, it
changes the path. When a compromised router drops some data
packets, the amount of volume that the receiver has received
and the volume information in the Query message differ, so the
receiver suspects that packets have been dropped and sends a
Permission message indicating a request to change path. To
change the path, the sender can use a relay node used for
tunneling or path diversity by multihoming. The method for
path changes is out of scope of this project.
Data packet loss due to natural causes is also possible, and
this is not an attack. Because of PDA, the natural packet loss
might be regarded as a dropping attack. To avoid this, we apply
a threshold-based decision scheme. If the difference between
the amount of delivered packets and the volume information
in the Query message is within a defined threshold, this is
not regarded as a dropping attack. However, if the difference
is bigger than the threshold, this is regarded as a dropping
attack. The threshold value can be defined by the receiver based
on the network environment. PDA can also detect the heavy
congestion link where there is significant packet loss, and it
triggers the path changes. Because of the retransmission scheme
in NTLP (GIST) for the signaling message, we can say that the
signaling message delivery is reliable. Thus, if there is signaling
message loss, this means that there is a dropping attack or the
link is heavily congested. Thus, the sender changes the path to
avoid signaling message dropping.
E. Robustness against the route change
Route changes, which occur by router failure, link failure, or
router restart, can affect the performance of PBS since the new
router that is on the new path is not aware of the permission
state of the flows. In PBS, however, the soft-state of GIST
can detect the route change and inform the PBS NSLP about
the changes, so the flow session can be set up at the new
router. Furthermore, the soft-state of PBS NSLP messages is
used for the detection of route changes. The new router, which
gets the new PBS Query and Permission message, updates the
permission state. The old router, which does not get signaling
messages for the flow after a soft-state period, removes the
permission state of the flow. The state updating time for the
route changes depends on the soft-state period. Before the new
permission state is installed on the new router, the flows are
rate-limited and volume-limited at the new router.
III. SECURITY ANALYSIS OF PBS
A. Attack handling in PBS
1) Trustworthy networks: Since the core network is trust-
worthy, routers are not compromised. Thus, there is no on-path
attack. However, an off-path attacker (external attacker) may
insert bogus packets into the data path.
When an off-path attacker does not spoof the address, the
attack packets can be dropped at a router by checking the 5-
tuple of the packets since they do not have permission.
If the attacker spoofs the address of one of the legitimate
senders who has permission, the legitimate sender cannot send
packets or can send packets with only a small portion of
its permission. However, even if the attacker is in the same
subnet as the legitimate sender and spoofs the sender’s address,
the attack packets will not pass IPsec validation and will be
dropped.. Since the network is trustworthy, symmetric key
cryptography algorithm for IPsec is a good solution for this
attack.
2) Byzantine networks: In Byzantine networks, in which we
trust neither the sender nor the routers, the off-path attacks can
be prevented by IPsec, similar to the method used in trustworthy
networks.
Unlike trustworthy networks, in Byzantine networks, the
compromised PBS router can inject the attack packets and drop
the legitimate packets. However, PDA can detect the packet
injection and dropping as shown in Section II-D. Since the
compromised router has a session key, IPsec using symmetric
key cryptography cannot prevent the attack. Thus, public key
cryptography should be applied for the authentication field of
IPsec AH. To avoid a compromised router that drops legitimate
packets, changing the data flow path is needed.
PDA can detect all attacks except for a replacement attack
because PDA is based on comparing the volume of data. In
the packet replacement attack, the attacker does not generate
or drop the packets, but changes the content of the packet.
Thus, this attack cannot be detected by PDA. One solution
to prevent the attack is to use message security by public
key cryptography for IPsec and apply to every data packets.
However, it requires computational overhead. Therefore, this
message security should be applied minimally. However, if the
network system requires high-end security, such as a military
system, the message security to every message is required even
though the system has to pay more cost.
B. Security issues
1) Permission granting process: The permission granting
process depends on the policy of the receiver. In PBS, we
assume that the receiver has a white list and a black list. The
sender in a white list can get the permission, but the sender in
a black list cannot get the permission from the receiver. This
white and black listing, however, has an introduction problem.
The introduction problem is on deciding whether the receiver
gives the permission to the sender, who is not on either of the
lists. In the current PBS system, we assume that anonymous
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Fig. 3. Attack flow ratio
user will get limited permission until the receiver suspects that
the user is not an attacker.
2) Denial-of-Permission: An attacker can send a lot of
Query messages, so the PBS router needs to validate the Query
messages and this requires computational overhead. We call this
attack a denial-of-permission attack. To prevent this attack, we
assume that computational puzzles [18][19] are used for rate-
limiting the Query message in the PBS system.
These security issues are the future work of this project.
C. Detection delay and number of attack flows
Since some of the attack flows can pass the router and reach
the receiver before the attack flows are detected by PDA, we
need to decrease the number of attack flows. As the attack flows
are detected quickly, the number of attack flows decreases.
Detection delay of attack flows by PDA depends on the soft-
state period of the signaling messages. We analyze how the
soft-state period affects the number of attack flows, and how
PDA can reduce the number of attack flows.
We assume that the attack flow arrival rate at the receiver,
λa, and the legitimate flow arrival rate, λl, follow Poisson
distribution. Thus, the total flow arrival rate at the receiver,
λ, is the sum of the two arrival rates. From the Little’s law,
we can find the average number of legitimate flows and attack








where E[Ta] is the expected lifetime of attack flows and
E[Tl] is the expected lifetime of legitimate flows. We assume
that the attack flows continue until they are detected and
terminated by PDA. Thus, the lifetime of attack flows in the
system is equal to the detection delay. Let the soft-state period
of signaling message, TP , be Tl/α where α is equal to or larger
than one. Since the arrival of attack flow between the soft-state
period follows uniform distribution, the average delay of attack






































Fig. 4. PBS implementation
where r is the ratio of attack flow arrival rate over total flow
arrival rate (r = λa/λ).
Figure 3 shows the attack flow ratio, R, with various r
and Tp. In the figure, even though attack flow arrival rate
ratio is 0.8 (i.e., attack flow arrival rate is much larger than
legitimate flow arrival rate), the attack flow ratio is less than 0.2
when Tp is Tl/10. This result shows the small soft-state period
decreases the detection delay, and because of the detection, the
number of attack flows is reduced. There is, however, a trade-off
between detection delay and signaling overhead (message and
processing overhead). As the period decreases, the signaling
overhead increases.
IV. PBS ARCHITECTURE AND IMPLEMENTATION
PBS has three components: on-path (path-coupled) signaling,
authorization, and traffic management. We have implemented
the components of PBS. Fig. 4 shows our PBS implementation
architecture.
A. On-path signaling
We are building PBS NSLP on the GIST implementation
[20], which provides the channel reliability (C-mode) and
security (TLS). PBS NSLP states are managed by a finite state
machine (FSM). Fig. 5 shows the FSM of PBS NSLP. PBS
NSLP parses and creates signaling messages at each node.
OpenSSL [21] is used for implementing cryptography algo-
rithms and processing X.509 certificates. The communication
between GIST and PBS NSLP is performed by Unix sockets.
More details about the signaling message formats and PBS
NSLP specification can be found in the Internet draft [15].
B. Authorization
The authorization component decides whether to grant per-
mission (amount of volume) and time limit for a flow. Another
main objective of this component is to detect and identify
attacks. The receiver’s policy for prevention mechanism, such
as selection of cryptography algorithm, against the detected
attack is located in this component. Authorization manages the
permission state table, which is implemented by a hashtable,
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(c) Router (State 1: Idle, 2: Wait for P, 3: Permission state, 4: IPsec
verification, 5: Compare RV and AV)
Fig. 5. Finite state machine (Event || Action) (Q: Query message, P:
Permission message, T.O.: Time out, AV: The number of bytes that the receiver
allows, SV: The number of bytes that the sender has sent, Recv: The number
of bytes that the node has received)
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Fig. 6. Permission state table. The 5-tuple is the key in the hashtable. (AV: The
number of bytes that the receiver grants; TTL: Time limit for the permission;
RT: The refresh period; Solution: The indicated solution against the attack
(change path, use public key cryptography, etc); PK: The sender’s public key;
























Fig. 7. Testbed. The router has two network interfaces (one interface is
connected to senders’ subnet, and the other interface is connected to receivers’
subnet.
C. Traffic management
The traffic management handles all incoming packets, includ-
ing signaling messages and data packets. It passes signaling
messages up to the on-path signaling component. Based on
the permission state of flows, the traffic manager screens the
data packets to see whether the data packets are authorized.
An IP packet filter is used to filter the unauthorized packets.
IPsec header is verified in this component. To see whether the
flow exceeds the given permission, this component monitors the
volume of the data flow that it has received since the permission
state was set up.
We implemented a userspace IPsec module which is a
modular IPsec stack that relies on user space by using netfilter
[22]. libiptc interfaces filter tables in the kernel space and
iptables filters IP packets. netfilter queue module
gets the packets to a user space if a rule matches. We set up
Linux routing tables using route.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
To show that PBS supports scalability, which is one of
the design goals of PBS, we measure the signaling overhead,
the CPU usage, memory overhead, and delays. Since the
performance of IPsec is evaluated in [23], we focus on the
performance evaluation of signaling messages. Fig. 7 shows the
testbed setup for performance measurement. The machines are
running Linux with kernel version 2.6.23, have AMD Opteron
2.2GHz CPUs, and 2GB RAM each.
A. Signaling overhead
The signaling overhead can be determined by the size of
signaling message and frequency of the messages. There are
two kinds of signaling messages: NTLP (GIST) and PBS NSLP
messages. Fu et al. measured the GIST handshake signaling
messages [14]. Thus, we focus on the PBS NSLP signaling
messages. In PBS NSLP, Query and Permission messages are
the NSLP data messages.
The total generated NSLP messages during a permission
session, Lnslp, is
Lnslp = (LQ + LP )× (bTL
TP
c+ 1)
7where LQ is the size of Query message, LP is the size of
Permission message, TL is the lifetime of the session, and TP
is the soft-state period of NSLP.
Table I shows the message size of PBS NSLP signaling of
NSIS layer. The size depends on the X.509 certificate size
that the signaling messages carry and the symmetric key size
that the Permission messages carry. We vary the public key
algorithms for the authentication field of signaling message.
The three public key algorithms have the same security level
(80-bit security level). The signaling message overhead also
depends on the protocol header sizes.
The total generated NSIS signaling message during a permis-
sion session, Lsignal, is the sum of the total generated NSLP
messages and GIST messages.




where L is the total data size including headers of link layer,
network layer, and transport layer protocol. Thus, L is
L = Ld +Np × Lheader
Np = d Ld
MSS
e
where Ld is the size of data message, Np is the number of
packets for the original data message, Lheader is the sum of the
header size of all layer protocols, and MSS is the maximum
segment size.
We assume that the permission state is set up for a flow
of streaming video using UDP. The size of the flow is 4 GB
and the running time of the flow is 90 minutes. Thus, the
permission state lasts for 90 minutes. We assume that the soft-
state periods of PBS NSLP and GIST are 60 seconds. Table I
shows the bandwidth usage of the signaling messages during
the permission session and signaling message overhead ratio.
TABLE I
PBS NSLP SIGNALING MESSAGE SIZE, AND BANDWIDTH AND SIGNALING
OVERHEAD RATIO FOR 4GB VIDEO STREAMING WHOSE RUNNING TIME IS
90 MINUTES—— THE FIRST COLUMN OF THE TABLE REPRESENTS THE











RSA-1024 1153 1189 0.376 0.000062
DSA-1024 1252 1292 0.403 0.000066
ECC-192 917 957 0.313 0.000051
B. Computational overhead
We measure the CPU usage to handle signaling messages at
a router. Since the sender generates a few sessions at a time,
the CPU usage of a sender is not a problem. When a receiver
is an end user host, there will be only a few simultaneous
sessions. Therefore, the CPU overhead is unlikely to become
significant. When a receiver is a server that handle much traffic,
some form of load balancing strategy is likely to be part of
its deployment, and this will spread the CPU load caused by
PBS. Thus, we mainly consider the router’s CPU usage. Fig.8
shows the CPU usage of PBS signaling message handling. The
CPU usages of PBS NSLP layer with different transport layer
protocols and security protocols are the same since the signaling
message delivery and channel security are performed at the
GIST layer and the NSLP layer is for the signaling message
verification and parsing. However, the CPU usage varies based
on the transmission protocol and security protocol in the GIST
layer. The CPU usage is the lowest when UDP is used and
the highest when TLS is used. Even though TLS is used for
the delivery of Query and Permission messages, the router can
handle 600 Query and 600 Permission messages per second. It
means that if the period of soft-state in PBS NSLP is 60 seconds
(short stream flows whose lifetime is less than 60 seconds get
one-time permission), the router can handle 36,000 sessions
concurrently.
Lee et al. [24] measured the network flows at the edge routers
of University of Auckland in 2006. They show the average
flow departure rate and lifetime of flows. By using their data
and Little’s law and assuming that arrival rate and departure
rate are same, we can get the average number of concurrent
flows, which is 10,000 flows, and the maximum number of
concurrent flows, which is 20,000 flows. Thus, PBS can be
applied to the edge router. Since the computer that we used
for our performance evaluation is old and slow, if we test the
CPU usage at a faster CPU, the CPU usage can be lower and
the router can handle more signaling messages.
C. Memory overhead
Since PBS is based on permission state, there is a memory
usage overhead for storing permission state (including keys) for
each flow. The memory size for storing session keys depends
on the key size and concurrent number of sessions. If there are
10,000 concurrent sessions, then session key storage requires
0.2 MB for HMAC-SHA1 and 1.28 MB for RSA-1024. If we
assume that each flow requires 100 bytes for storing other
information, it only requires 1MB with 10,000 concurrent
sessions. Therefore, the total memory usage for PBS is not
a problem.
D. Delay
Since a sender has to get permission before sending data
packets, there is one round-trip delay before sending the data
packets.
The one-hop delay of Query and Permission message deliver,
Tquery and Tpermission, are
Tquery = Tgist + Tqtx + Tqpr
Tpermission = Tptx + Tppr
where Tgist is the GIST handshake delay, Tqtx is the sum
of transmission delay and propagation delay of the Query mes-
sage, Tqpr is the Query message processing delay , Tptx is the
sum of transmission and propagation delay of the Permission
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Fig. 8. CPU usage of PBS at a router when RSA-1024 is used for public key cryptography. The X-axis represents the rate of Query and Permission message
pairs per second. For example, 400 means that the router handles 400 Query messages and 400 Permission messages per second.
There is no GIST handshake delay in the Permission message
delivery since GIST handshake was already performed during
the delivery of the Query message.
Thus, the total round-trip time, RTT , is
RTT = (Tquery + Tpermission)× (Nr + 1)
where Nr is the number of routers that have a PBS func-
tionality.
TABLE II
PROCESSING DELAY IN MSEC WHEN RSA-1024 IS USED FOR
AUTHENTICATION FIELD —— THE FIRST ROW OF THE TABLE REPRESENTS
THE TRANSPORT LAYER PROTOCOL TO DELIVER SIGNALING MESSAGES
UDP TCP TLS
GIST handshake delay 0.411 10.057 23.383
Processing delay (Query) 0.423 0.429 0.523
Processing delay (Permission) 0.436 0.429 0.523
Since the propagation delay depends on the physical link
and the transmission delay depends on the network link, we
focus on the processing delay which depends on the PBS
functionality, including cryptography algorithm. Since signaling
messages have the authentication field generated by the public
key, the verification of the authentication at a router increases
the processing delay.
Table II shows GIST handshake delay and the PBS NSLP
processing delay by protocols. GIST handshake delays are
different by protocols since TCP requires a TCP session setup
delay and TLS requires additional TLS session handshakes.
Processing delays when UDP and TCP are used are almost
same. However, when TLS is used, since the message is
encrypted by a session key, decryption is required for signaling
messages. Thus, the processing delay when TLS is used is the
largest.
VI. DEPLOYMENT AND APPLICATION
To effectively prevent attacks, at least one PBS router should
be placed between the attacker and the receiver. If the edge
router in the receiver’s area has PBS functionality, the edge
router can properly handle the attacks even though the attack
packets are generated in the backbone area. If the edge router
in the attacker’s area has PBS functionality, the attacks can be
prevented near the attacker. Thus, installing the PBS functional-
ity at the edge router can effectively prevent the attacks that are
generated in the middle of the path. However, the current PBS
system is unable to handle the case where the edge router in the
receiver’s area is compromised. If the compromised edge router
starts sending attack packets, these would reach the receiver.
PBS is based on deny-by-default. Thus, in close-networks in
which all end-users have PBS functionality, the packets that do
not have permission will be dropped at the router. However, for
short stream flows, such as DNS and ICMP, the cost in terms
of flow state setup delay and signaling message overhead is
high. Thus, PBS is not applicable to these short stream flows.
The short stream flows can be rate-limited, and the rate-limiting
can reduce the effect of attacks by flooding the short streaming
data.
In the open-networks in which some end users do not have
PBS functionality, the packets that do not have PBS func-
tionality will be rate-limited. Therefore, those packets without
permission will be treated as short stream flows.
VII. RELATED WORK
Capability-based mechanisms, such as Capabilities [7], SIFF
[8], TVA [9] and Portcullis [10], are similar to PBS since
they use explicit permission. Data packets carry a capability, a
collection of path specific information that is inserted by routers
using a keyed hash algorithm. The capability is granted by the
receiver. Thus, the packets that do not have the capability are
dropped at routers. However, if an off-path attacker who spoofs
a legitimate sender’s address is in the same subnet and obtains
the capabilities through eavesdropping, the attacker can inject
the attack packets using the capabilities. Furthermore, these
mechanisms can be compromised by the on-path attacker. Com-
promised routers can announce the capability to the upstream
nodes, so the nodes can use the capability. Furthermore, the
compromised router can use the capability to inject the attack
9flow and it can drop legitimate packets. Unlike PBS, there
is no monitoring algorithm in capability-based mechanisms,
these attacks cannot be detected and prevented. Since PBS
uses on-path signaling for permission state setup at routers,
PBS supports the easy installation and management of the
permission state. In addition, the periodic state refresh through
on-path signaling in PBS supports robustness of the system
from state changes. However, capability-based mechanisms are
weak during state changes.
Pushback [3] is an aggregate-based filtering mechanism. A
router asks upstream routers to rate-limit an aggregate that
causes congestion of the link. It cannot differentiate attack
packets and poor packets (that are under the attack). If the
legitimate packets and attack packets are in the same edge
network, the legitimate packets are also dropped by rate-
limiting.
StopIt [4] is filter-based DoS defense system. It installs
filters at StopIt servers through request messages when there
is an attack. If a StopIt server discovers that a sender is
misbehaving, it sends a StopIt request to the sender, and a StopIt
server will filter the flow from the sender. However, it requires
modifying BGP to announce the StopIt servers’ addresses. It
does not effectively prevent on-path attacks, especially black
hole attacks. Furthermore, the flooding attacks have already
affected the links and the destination before the filtering is
installed at StopIt servers.
NUTSS [25] presents an architecture for flow establishment
using off-path and on-path signaling. NUTSS mainly consid-
ers naming, addressing, and middle box configuration. Even
though NUTSS also presents a scheme to prevent attacks, it
uses capabilities for this. Thus, it has the same problems as
capability-based approaches.
VIII. CONCLUSION
We developed PBS, a signaling architecture for network
traffic authorization. PBS is the hybrid of proactive (explicit
permission) and reactive approach (monitoring network traffic
for attacks) to prevent DoS attacks. PBS supports secure per-
mission state setup and management, robustness against route
changes. PBS works on the current networking architecture
using existing transport protocols (UDP or TCP) and security
protocols (public key cryptography, TLS/DTLS, IPsec).
We show that the PBS detection algorithm (PDA) can
efficiently detect on-path and off-path attacks regardless of
network type (trustworthy or Byzantine networks). Based on the
detected and identified attacks, PBS suggests solutions, such as
using stronger cryptography algorithm for IPsec or changing
the data path, to the senders that are affected by the attack.
Our analysis shows that PBS can prevent various kinds of
attacks and the performance evaluation shows that PBS supports
scalability.
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